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CURRENT DECISIONS
ALIEN ENEmIEs-RIGHT TO SuE-AusTRIAN SUING AS NEXT FREN FOR INFANT
SoN .- A native of Austria, residing in North Carolina, brought suit as next
friend for his infant son to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by the latter. The United States declared war against Austria-Hungary after
the verdict in the suit was returned but before the judgment was entered. Over
the defendant's objection judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Held, that
the suit was maintainable. Krachanake v. Ac'me Mfg. Co. (1918, N. C.) 95
S. E. 851.
The case, which is of first impression in North Carolina, correctly applies the
general rule that the right of an.alien enemy to sue in our courts turns upon
his residence, not his nationality. The opinion contains an interesting review
of the authorities, and refers to Mr. Picciotto's article in (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 167.
ALIENS-NATURALZATIoN--TEmPORARY NATURALIZATION FOR SERVIcE IN ARmY
REFUSED.-The Act of May 9, 1918 (Public, No. 144, 65th Congr.) authorized
the naturalization of aliens who enter the service of the Army or Navy of the
United States. The examination of certain alien soldiers, applicants for natural-
ization under this statute, disclosed their intention not to remain in the United
States after discharge from the service, but to return to their native country
to remain there permanently. Held, that the applicants were not entitled to
naturalization. In re Naturalization of Aliens in Service of Army or Navy
(1918, E. D. Mo.) 250 Fed. 316.
The decision seems entirely correct. Naturalization obtained without intent
to reside permanently in the United States has always been regarded by the
State Department as fraudulent. This view is confirmed by section 15 of the
Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat L. 6Ol) which construes the naturalization as
having been acquired in bad faith if the citizen establishes his permanent resi-
dence abroad within five years of his admission to citizenship, and by section
2 of the Act of March 2, i9o7 (34 Stat. L. 1228) which provides for a forfeiture
of citizenship if the naturalized citizen shall have resided two years in his native
country. A person cannot seek temporary naturalization in the United States.
See Luria v. United States (1913) 231 U. S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. IO.
ARMY AND NAvY-INDucTION UNDER DRAFr Acr-CoMPuLsoRY SURGICAL OPERA-
ToN ON DRAr-r-A registrant was certified into military service, and, though
suffering from hernia, the local board and the examining army officers did not
reject him. Instead, they ordered him to undergo a surgical operation. He
refused to submit, and in habeas corpus proceedings claimed his release on the
ground that, as he could not be compelled to submit to the operation, he was
physically disabled and entitled to discharge from further military duty. Held,
that the registrant was not entitled to discharge and that the writ must be
dismissed. De Genaro v. Johnson, Brigadier-General (1918 E. D. N. Y.) 249
Fed. 504.
By the Selective Draft Act and sections i116 and 1342 of the U. S. Revised
Statutes the decision of the examining board, exemption or military, on a
question of fact is final.and cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus. In re Traina
(1918, E. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. ioo4. After his induction into service the registrant
is subject to military law and cannot obtain his discharge from the army through
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the civil courts. By military law a soldier may be required to submit to an
operation designed to increase his fitness for service and not endangering his
life. See (1917) Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army, 33.
BAxxRuPTcY-PR FRENCES-REvING BARRED DEBT AS PREFE cE.-The day
before a petition in bankruptcy was filed against him, a debtor made a pay-
ment upon a statute-barred debt, intending to revive it. The debtor was aware
of his insolvent condition, the creditor was not. The creditor, offering to
restore the payment, filed his claim on the revived debt. Held, that the claim
was allowable since its revival could not be considered a preference, the creditor
being unaware of the insolvency. In re Salmon (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 249 Fed. 300.
The decision in the instant case .overrules the judgment of the lower court
reported in (igi6, S. D. N. Y.) 239 Fed. 413. There the revival was treated
as an "incumbrance" and held void under section 67e of the Bankruptcy Act.
This view, as pointed out in (1917) 27 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 126, is highly
questionable and unsupported by authority. It is submitted that the Circuit
Court of Appeals took the proper view of the situation when it regarded the
revival merely as a preference and not as an "incumbrance."
CONSTITUTIOAL LAw-Ex POST FACTO LAWS--NENW YORK PAROLE LAW
VAim.-The Parole Commission Act of New York (Laws 1915, ch. 579), pro-
viding for a system of indeterminate sentence and parole for criminals, does not
become actually effective in a given territory until certain local authorities appoint
a Parole Commission. The relator in a writ of habeas corpus maintained that
as applied to him the act was ex post facto. The crime for which he was
imprisoned was committed after the passage by the legislature of the law in
question but before it had become fully operative in the part of the state
concerned by the appointment of a Parole Commission. Held, that the law was
not ex post facto as applied to the relator. People ex rel. Cerzosie v. The
Warden of New York County Penitentiary (1918, N. Y.) 119 N. E. 564.
The decision, which apparently has no exact precedent to support it, seems
equally sensible and sound. The law in question obviously does, not in any
way produce the kind of unfair result against which the constitutional prohibi-
tion of ex post facto laws is directed. The decision may profitably be compared
with Neal v. Hines (1918, Ky.) 203 S. W. 578, holding constitutional, as applied
to persons already convicted of crime, a statute extending the beriod during
which parole could not be granted. There, however, the original parole statute
expressly provided that the persons described should be eligible to parole "as
now or may hereafter be prescribed." (The attention of the learned reader
is called to an editorial note in (1918) 34 L. QuART. REv. 9, pointing out that
the expression ex postfacto is in current usage incorrectly written and printed
as three words, ex post facto. Among the first to commit this error was Lord
Coke; he was followed by Blackstone, Bentham and Austin. So it is not
surprising that the error became general.)
CoNTRACTs-THIB PA=y BENEFIciARY-SuiT BY DONEE-BENEFICIARY.-A
husband promised his wife on her death bed that in consideration of her exe-
cuting a certain will he would himself bequeath a specified sum to a favorite
niece of the wife. The niece sued the husband's executor for breach of the
above promise. Held (three judges dissenting), that the niece was entitled to
maintain an action on the contract. Seaver v. Ransom (19z8, N. Y.). Decided
Oct. I, 1918.
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The Court of Appeals here affirms the decision of the Appellate Division
(1918) 168 N. Y. Supp. 454, as to which see note in 27 YALE LAW, Jou aAL, 563.
See also Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (I918) 27 YALE
LAW JouNrAL, ioo8, which is cited in the opinion. The development of the
New York law on this subject is set forth in an excellent opinion of Mr. Justice
Pound, and the statement of the lower court that "The doctrine of Lawrence
v. Fox is progressive, not retrograde" is approved.
DOWER-PERSONS ENTITLED-DESERTING AND ADULTEROUS Wi'E.-A married
woman deserted her husband in 1871 and never returned to him. For many
years she lived in adultery with other men. In 1914 the husband died testate.
The wife claimed dower in his estate. The claim was resisted on the ground
that under the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, ch. 34 (1285), which
came to be recognized as part of the common law of England, the desertion and
subsequent adultery of the wife operated to bar her claim for dower. Held,
that the wife was entitled to dower. Eschweiler, J., dissenting. Davis v. Davis
(1I918, Wis.) 167 N. W. 879.
The majority of the court took the view that the statutory system of divorce
in Wisconsin, which makes adultery a ground for divorce, had. provided a
broader remedy than the English law and had therefore superseded it. The
dissenting judge took the view that the Wisconsin statutes merely gave an
additional remedy without conflicting with the English law in any way. The
cases in other jurisdictions are in conflict. Citations are given in the prevailing
and in the dissenting opinion. From the point of view of policy there seems
no answer to the dissenting judge's view that "the'-faithless ought not now to
be rewarded as though faithful."
INJUNCTION-RESTRAINING ENFORCEMENT OF ALLEGED INVALID ORDINANCE.-
The Shredded Wheat Company, a New York corporation, asked in Illinois for
an injunction to restrain the City of Elgin from enforcing an ordinance which
required the payment of a license fee by any person distributing hand bills,
samples, and other advertising matter. The complainant claimed that in dis-
tributing its advertising matter it was engaged in interstate commerce and that
therefore the ordinance was unconstitutional. It alleged that "irreparable injury"
would result from enforcement of the ordinance, but to substantiate this allega-
tion stated no other facts than those given above. Held, that the complainant
was not entitled to equitable relief. Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin
(1918, Ill.) 12o N. E. 248.
The decision in the case is an excellent example of the lack of provision in
our system of law for the rendering of declaratory judgments. See Borchard,
The Declaratory Judgment, supra, p. i. Relief in equity is here denied on the
ground that "there is no reason why the validity of the ordinance may not be
determined by a court of law in . . . a [criminal] prosecution. If it is
invalid, the prosecution will fail and the complainant will not be injured, and
if it is valid, there is no ground upon which its enforcement should be enjoined."
Thus the plaintiff is compelled, in order to ascertain whether he is legally
privileged to distribute the advertising matter without a license, to run the risk
of subjecting himself to a successful criminal prosecution if his attorney's view
of a doubtful question of constitutional law turns out to be incorrect.
JOINT TENANCY-PERsoNAL PROPERTY-JOINT BANK DEPosrr PAYABLE TO
SupvivoR-Mrs. Rusk deposited money in a bank and received a certificate of
deposit payable to herself or her daughter, "or the survivor." The bank
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thereafter paid interest on the deposit to the daughter. When Mrs. Rusk died
the daughter claimed the deposit for her own and a granddaughter claimed it
for Mrs. Rusk's estate. Held, that the daughter was entitled to the deposit.
Erwin v. Felter (1918, IlL) 119 N. E. 926.
The Appellate Court had held that no valid gift of the money had been effected
by the deposit. Felter v. Erwin (1917) 2o6 Ill. App. 521. The Supreme Court
gives no consideration to the principles relating to gifts but treats the trans-
action as creating a joint-tenancy. In cases involving joint bank deposits the
right of the survivor is usually sustained, but the courts are by no means agreed
as to the true grounds for reaching this result. See Wisner v. Wisner (1918,
W. Va.) 95 S. E. 8o2; and cases collected in L. R. A. 1917 C, 550.
MINES AND MINERALs-ExTRALATERAL RIGHTS-Two FISSURES wrrH ONE
APEx-Some distance below the apex a true fissure vein separated into two
fissures or descending limbs, one of which dipped northerly through one side
line and the other of which dipped southerly through the opposite side line.
Held, that the one apex controlled both descending limbs and that the location
of the apex had extralateral rights on both limbs and through both side lines.
Jim Butler Tonopah Mining Co. v. West End Consolidated Mining Co. (1918)
38 Sup. Ct. 574.
This is quite consistent with previous decisions dealing with veins forming a
junction on the dip. .Where there are two apices they may be located separately
and the elder location gets the entire vein at the line of junction and below.
U. S. Rev. St. see. 2336. In the lower court the vein in this case had been
described as an anticlinal fold, the crdst of which was held to be an apex. Jim
Butler, etc. Co. v. West End, etc. Co. (1916) 39 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876. That
supposed "crest" now appears to be the top edge of a single fissure, splitting
below into two descending limbs.
STATUTORY CONSTRUcTIoN-PRAcTIcE OF MEDICINE-DIAGNOSING DIsEAs-
The defendant, a "chiropractor" who held no license to practice medicine,
examined a patient, made a diagnosis of abdominal tumor, and recommended an
operation by a competent surgeon. The defendant was convicted of "practicing
medicine" without a license. Held, that the diagnosis of disease constituted
the "practice of medicine" within the meaning of the Minnesota statute. State
v. Rolph (1918, Minn.) 167 N. W. 553.
The decision follows previous -adjudications in Minnesota. Statutes regulating
the practice of medicine fall into two classes: (I) those which seek to prevent
the use of drugs, surgical instruments, etc., by unlicensed persons; (2) those
which seek to prevent the practice of the healing art in any manner by
unlicensed persons. Under the first class, the "chiropractor" is not practicing
medicine. State v. Fite (1916) 29 Idaho, 463, 159 Pac. 1183. Under the second
class, he is. People v. Oakley (I916) 3o Cal. App. 419, I58 Pac. 5o5.
WILLs-LEGACIES ON CONDITION-CONDITION DEPENDENT UPON CONDUCT OF
LEGATEE'S HUSBAND Vom-A testator bequeathed property in trust, directing
the trustee to pay the income thereof to the testator's two granddaughters upon
the condition that they and their husbands, if they should marry, entirely
abstain from the use of tobacco and of all kinds of intoxicating liquors as a
beverage, and adopt a particular spelling of the testator's surname "Tyrrel"
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whenever they should have occasion to write or spell it. The trustee filed a
bill to construe the will One of the granddaughters was married and her
husband was living. Held, that the conditions were valid in so far as they
were made dependent upon the conduct of the beneficiaries themselves, but were
void in so far as they were made dependent upon the conduct of the husbands
of such beneficiaries. Holmes v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (I918)
92 Conn. 507, 1O3 Atl. 64o.
The court reasons that too great a power of domination would be furnished
the husband if he could threaten: "If you don't do as I wish, I'll smoke and
you will lose your legacy1" Such power would be conducive of longings to
escape from the marital yoke, and provocative of family discord. Hence the
conditions are opposed to public policy and void. No precedent is cited; nor
has one been found, but the reasoning seems sound. Cf. Higgins v. Eaton
(i9IO, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 178 Fed. 153, where a legacy to a sister, conditioned
upon her .brother going to live with her, was lost by his electing to live
elsewhere. See also Anonymous (I913, Surr. Ct.) 41 N. Y. Supp. 7oo.
WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACT-AccDENT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT-
ExERTIoN RUPTURING DEFEcrIvE HEAxT.-In a proceeding under the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws II5, ch. io6) for compensation because
of the death of a coal miner while loading a coal car, it appeared that the death
was due to a rupture of the aorta, which was in a diseased condition and
apparently liable to be ruptured by any kind of violent or sudden physical exer-
tion. The rupture in fact took place when the workman exerted himself to
aid in pushing the car along the track. Held, that the accident arose out and
in the course of the employment. Dausman, J., dissenting. Indian Creek Coal
& Mining Co. v. Calvert (I918, Ind.) iig N. E. 51g.
The case turns of course upon the meaning of the words, "accident arising
out of the employment." The opinion of the majority contains a review of
many of the leading English and American cases, and is in accord with the
general trend of the later decisions. Cf. (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 144;
ibid. 578.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-PERSoNs ENTITLED To COMPENSATION-EFFECT
OF WIDoW's REmARRIAGE.-In a proceeding for compensation under the Massa-
chusett's Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, pt 2, sec. 6, as
amended) the defense was that the one seeking compensation, the widow of
the deceased employee, had remarried and was no longer dependent for her
support upon payments under the Act. Held, that the remarriage of the widow
did not terminate her right to compensation. Bott's. Case (1918, Mass.) 119
N. E. 756.
The precise question involved in this case seems not to have been previously
decided. The court had preyiously held in Murphy's Case (I916) 224 Mass.
592, 113 N. E. 283, that upon a dependent's death the right to payments under
the Act did not pass to his personal representatives, as that would frequently
result in payments to persons in no way dependent upon the deceased. The
present case construes the act to mean that a person who is a "dependent"
-at the time of the injury remains so in spite of a subsequent change in the con-
dition of actual dependency. The decision seems to carry out the meaning of
the words used in the Massachusetts statute. As the court suggests, if it be
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thought that the result is undesirable, the only remedy is to apply to the legis-
lature. In some jurisdictions this has already been done. See following .note.
Cf. Moore v. Peet Bros. Manufacturing Co. (1917) 99 Kan. 443, i62 Pac. 295.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-WiDow's RIGHT TO COMPENSATION-EFFEcT
OF STATUTE TERMINATING COMPENSATION AFTER REmARm .AE.-Section 12 of the
New Jersey Compensation Act of i9gi provided for weekly compensation for
3o0 weeks to the widow of an employee killed in the course of employment.
A later amendment provided fhat the right "under this section" shall cease if
the widow shall remarry." The plaintiff's husband was killed prior to the
amendment and the defendant paid the compensation until her remarriage.
She sued for weekly installments accruing thereafter. Held, that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover, since her right to compensation for the full 300 weeks
was a "vested right." Hansen v. Brann & Stewart Co. (r917, N. J. Sup. Ct.)
103 At. 696.
The principal case is noteworthy, not because it enunciates any new or strik-
ing principle, but because it is concerned with a new phase of the law: work-
men's compensation, and an old concept: "vested rights." There is little doubt
as to the soundness of the decision; the court follows the general rule as to
when a right created by statute becomes "vested" and is-beyond revocation.
